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Abstract
The use of explicit inflation targets has meant that monetary policy has become more transparent and
also easier to evaluate. The analysis in this paper is based on forecasts by Sveriges Riksbank (the
Central Bank of Sweden) on real output and inflation. Our purpose is to separate the effects on the
interest rate instrument of (i) discretionary changes in the rule for monetary policy and (ii) judgments in
forecasting. We first feed the Riksbank￿s forecasts into two different simple rules for interest rate
policy. The differences between the interest rates implied by these benchmark rules and the actual
policy rate are interpreted as measures of ￿policy shocks￿. Second, we compare the Riksbank￿s
forecasts with alternative forecasts. Using a benchmark rule for the setting of the policy rate, we can
use the differences between the forecasts to define measures of the effects of the Riksbank￿s
￿judgments￿ on its interest rate policy.
1. Introduction
In order to understand the effects of monetary policy, we have to be able to identify, among other
things, movements in interest rates and monetary aggregates that are induced by changes in policy
(as opposed to changes in other factors, eg money demand). Attempts to describe central banks￿
monetary policies have been undertaken by researchers using different methods. One common
approach has been to use time-series models, such as vector autoregressions (VARs), to estimate
￿shocks￿ to interest rates using a minimum of a priori restrictions. Christiano et al (1998) provide a
review of this literature. A quite different approach has been to single out specific episodes when
monetary policy is believed to have been especially active and effective and to scrutinise both policy
documents and macroeconomic data from those episodes. Although such studies can hardly provide
strong statistical evidence, it is clear that careful studies of specific events can yield useful information
about the design and effects of monetary policy. The study by Milton Friedman and Anna Schwartz
(1963) is probably the most well known example. Christina and David Romer have applied a similar
approach in a number of more recent studies (eg Romer and Romer (1989)).
2
A serious evaluation of policy requires rather detailed information about policy objectives and rules
and about the information policymakers have at their disposal when they make their decisions. This
type of information is not readily available, either for external economists or economists at the central
banks themselves. One reason for this is that policy decisions are made on the basis of many different
kinds and sources of information, which in the policy process are weighed together in complicated and
informal ways. Policy is to a large extent based on judgments and discretionary decisions. It is not
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simply the result of model forecasts that are plugged into policy rules to which the central banks have
committed themselves in advance.
During the last decade, however, many central banks have started to follow policies that have been
characterised as ￿constrained discretion￿ (Bernanke and Mishkin (1997)). These central banks have
defined explicit inflation targets and have also obtained increased independence to achieve their
goals. This development has been associated with an increased demand for information about, and
analyses of, monetary policy. It has also provided incentives for central bankers to explain their
policies to the general public. Examples of this can be found in Australia, Canada, New Zealand,
Sweden, the United Kingdom and the European monetary union, although the approaches to inflation
targeting differ somewhat between these countries.
The use of explicit inflation targets has meant that monetary policy has become more transparent and
also easier to evaluate. For instance, many of the inflation targeting central banks claim that their
policies are forecast-based. If the forecasts are also actually published, then interesting insights into
the central banks￿ reaction functions can be gained from investigating the effects of forecasts on
policy. On the other hand, if there is a close relation between a published forecast and decisions on
monetary policy, then policy considerations may also influence the forecast. A comparison of a central
bank￿s forecasts with some alternative sets of forecasts may thus yield useful information about
monetary policy.
In this paper we analyse monetary policy in Sweden during the first six years of the inflation targeting
regime, 1992-98. More precisely, our purpose is to investigate if it is possible to describe this monetary
policy in terms of a simple reaction function that relates the interest rate instrument to reasonable
forecasts of macroeconomic conditions. We try to separate the effects on the interest rate of
(i) discretionary changes in the rule for monetary policy and (ii) judgments in forecasting.
In undertaking our study we combine time-series methods with information from policy documents.
Specifically, we look at the forecasts of inflation and GDP growth produced by the  Riksbank in
connection with its Inflation Reports 1992-98. Our study is (to our knowledge) unique in the sense that
it constitutes a first attempt to comprehensively analyse actual real-time forecasts undertaken by an
inflation targeting central bank. Given such forecasts, it is possible not only to evaluate the forecasts
per se but also to relate them to the policy decisions that were actually made. We hope that this
exercise is interesting not only for economists inside central banks, but also to market participants and
politicians (who may want to evaluate and better understand monetary policy) and researchers (who
may be interested in realistic estimates of ￿policy shocks￿).
3 We furthermore believe that analyses of
this kind are important and necessary to support the mandate and the increased operational
independence recently given to many central banks.
We first feed the Riksbank￿s forecasts into two different simple rules for interest rate policy - one
forward-looking Taylor-type rule suggested by Rudebusch and Svensson (1999), the ￿RS rule￿, and
another which seems to lie closer to the rule suggested by the Riksbank itself in its Inflation Reports,
the ￿RB rule￿. The differences between the actual policy rates and the interest rates implied by these
benchmark rules are interpreted as measures of ￿policy shocks￿. These reflect changes of the policy
rate that, given the rules, are not motivated by the Riksbank￿s own forecasts.
Second, we compare the Riksbank￿s forecasts with alternative forecasts on which the bank could very
well have chosen to base its monetary policy: real-time forecasts produced by a VAR model and by
other analysts. Using a benchmark rule for the setting of the policy rate, we can then use the
differences between the forecasts to define measures of the effects of the Riksbank￿s ￿judgments￿ on
its interest rate policy. One of our measures of the impact of ￿judgments￿ is thus the calculated change
in the policy rate that, given a policy rule, does not appear to be motivated by forecasts derived from a
formal model-based approach (in our case a VAR). Our second measure is obtained through a similar
calculation where forecasts by other institutions are substituted for the model-based forecasts. The
latter measure presumably reflects not only judgmental adjustments of model forecasts, since other
institutions￿ forecasts are not entirely model-based but are also affected by judgments. The differences
between the Riksbank￿s forecasts and those of other institutions may also reflect ￿informational
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advantages￿ - or ￿disadvantages￿ - that the Riksbank may have, eg about the state of the economy or
the effects of monetary policy.
The paper is organised as follows: the Riksbank￿s forecasts from 1992-98 are presented in Section 2;
Section 3 discusses the simple rules for the policy rate that serve as our benchmarks; in Section 4 we
present our estimates of ￿policy shocks￿; Section 5 compares the different sets of forecasts of the
arguments that enter the simple rules and presents the effects of the Riksbank￿s ￿judgments￿;
Section 6, finally, gives conclusions and includes some suggestions for further research.
A quick summary of the results is as follows: (i) the Riksbank has followed a forecast-based policy rule
quite closely, ie ￿policy shocks￿ in the sense of deviations from such a rule have been small; (ii) actual
policy has been less activist, in particular in response to output fluctuations, than predicted by the
theoretical RS rule; (iii) deviations between the Riksbank￿s forecasts and those of other institutions
have been small; and (iv) ￿judgments￿ nevertheless seem quantitatively important, since there are
large deviations between the Riksbank￿s forecasts and forecasts produced by a VAR model.
2. Forecasts vs outcomes
Not all central banks (even inflation targeters) publish their forecasts of inflation and other
macroeconomic variables. In the case of the Riksbank approximate numerical inflation and GDP
growth forecasts (for calendar years) started to emerge during 1996. Around the end of 1997 and the
beginning of 1998 approximate annual inflation forecasts appeared on a quarterly basis. Numerical
forecasts of inflation and GDP growth to one decimal place were introduced in the Inflation Reports in
March 1998 and March 1999 respectively. The inflation and GDP growth forecasts made in 1992-96
were first published in connection with the Inflation Report in June 2000.
The Riksbank￿s forecasts for 1992-98 are reported in Figures 1 and 2 together with the actual
outcomes for annual CPI inflation and GDP growth. To facilitate our discussion and analysis, the same
data are also reported in Tables 1 and 2.
4 At each forecast occasion, forecasts of inflation and real
GDP growth are produced for the current year and, at most, the two following calendar years.
5 The
forecast occasions are quarterly. The actual outcomes of inflation and GDP growth each year t can
thus be compared with at most 12 earlier forecasts of these figures - four forecasts per year from
years t 2 , t 1 and t. The actual development of consumer prices is reported by Statistics Sweden
on a monthly basis and GDP figures on a quarterly basis.
Figure 1 shows that the Riksbank￿s inflation forecasts are systematically higher than the actual
outcomes for the corresponding years. There is only one exception to this rule (the forecast for 1994
undertaken in April 1994). As can be seen from Figure 2, the same systematic pattern does not obtain
for the Riksbank￿s forecasts of GDP growth.
Several further observations can be made in relation to Figures 1 and 2:
(i) The Riksbank￿s inflation forecasts are conditioned on the assumption of an unchanged policy
rate. They are thus not intended to be optimal forecasts in a mean-squared-error sense.
6 It is
not clear, however, that this can explain the systematic overpredictions. One reason is that
the Riksbank￿s forecasts (like those of most other central banks) are largely determined by
judgments. The conditioning of the forecast on a constant interest rate assumption is
obviously extremely difficult without the use of a formal model. Thus, it cannot be ruled out
that these forecasts have to some extent been implicitly conditioned on a policy rate that
changes over time.
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There is one property of the CPI index, however, which can perhaps explain, at least partly,
the forecast errors when the forecast is conditioned on an unchanged interest rate. A lower
short-term interest rate implies an autonomous negative effect on the housing cost
component in the CPI, which - at least temporarily - puts downward pressure on the CPI.
The initial effect of a more expansionary monetary policy, aimed at eventually raising
inflation, may thus be a fall in the registered rate of inflation. How much of the forecast errors
can be explained by such mechanisms cannot, however, be determined without an explicit
structural model which also includes other channels between monetary policy and inflation.
7
(ii) The forecast errors become smaller as the forecast horizon is approached. The typical
pattern of inflation forecasts, apparent from Figure 1, is that they start at a higher level than
the eventual outcome (often more than 1 percentage point higher) and then gradually
converge to the outcome. For example, according to the figures in Table 3, two-years-ahead
forecasts for inflation (eight steps ahead in the table) have a root mean-squared error
(RMSE) that is almost twice as large as that for inflation forecasts with a one-year horizon
(four steps ahead in the table).
8 On some occasions, however, the inflation forecast has
temporarily moved in the ￿wrong￿ direction. Two of these (October 1994 and August 1997)
were - as shown in Figure 3 - followed by increases in the policy rate. This suggests that
expectations of higher inflation caused the Riksbank to deviate from the downward interest
rate trend that characterised the sample period. That inflation eventually turned out to be
lower than expected may of course partly have been the result of the temporary contractions
in monetary policy. However, again, some model is needed to evaluate such propositions.
9
(iii)  The forecasts of GDP growth are on average more accurate than the inflation forecasts. This
is somewhat surprising, since information about actual GDP growth becomes available with
a considerable lag, approximately two quarters, and revisions occur frequently. That inflation
forecast errors become smaller as the forecast horizon is approached is less surprising. New
information about actual inflation becomes available on a monthly basis, with a lag of
approximately two weeks, and the CPI figures are only subject to very small revisions on an
annual basis.
10 This explains why GDP growth forecasts show less tendency to converge to
the actual outcomes than inflation forecasts (cf Figure 2 and Table 3); but it does not explain
why GDP growth forecasts have been more accurate than inflation forecasts.
(iv)  There was a regime shift in Swedish monetary policy in 1992-93, from an exchange rate
target to an explicit inflation target. Such changes make forecasting even more difficult than
it is under more stable circumstances. That inflation was lower than expected during the
1990s is furthermore something that was experienced in many other countries.
11 It can be
noted, however, that there is no tendency for the inflation forecasts to become more
accurate over time, something one might perhaps have expected, if forecasters learn about
the effects of the regime shift over time. As shown in Table 1, the RMSEs were eg much
smaller for the forecasts of inflation of 1994 and 1995 than for the forecasts of 1996-98. The
reason is that the first forecasts for 1994 and 1995 started at a level much closer to the
eventual outcome than the corresponding forecasts for 1996-98. Another way to express the
same thing is to say that actual inflation has come down quite dramatically, but forecasts
have not responded to that development to the same degree. The RMSEs for forecasts of
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GDP growth have, on the other hand, become smaller over time. The RMSE was much
larger for the forecasts of GDP growth of 1994 and 1995 than 1997 and 1998 (Table 2).
3. Simple rules for monetary policy
3.1 The case for simple rules
Central banks with explicit inflation targets (and some without) repeatedly stress that their interest rate
policy has to be forward-looking and pre-emptive. One reason for this is that it is believed that the
effects of changes in monetary policy (or at least some of the effects) occur with a considerable lag.
But even if the central bank could already control inflation perfectly in the short run, policy might have
to be forward-looking for other reasons. High ambitions to stabilise inflation in the short run would
imply considerable volatility in short-term nominal interest rates, which presumably would be
transmitted into high volatility in real variables such as GDP growth and unemployment (see
eg Svensson (2000)). In practice, monetary policy is characterised by interest rate smoothing, which
may reflect that central banks, in addition to price stability, are concerned with financial stability, or real
stability, or both.
It is quite common for central banks with an explicit inflation target also to indicate that they aim to
close the gap between the inflation target and the inflation forecast at a certain forecast horizon,
typically around two years. This principle, or rule of thumb, can be interpreted in two different ways.
The inflation forecast two years ahead may be an optimal intermediate target for monetary policy if it
takes two years before a change in the interest rate can have any significant effect on inflation. This is
the case in Svensson￿s (1999) model of an inflation targeting central bank. Alternatively, one may view
a rule-of-thumb relation between the interest rate and the inflation forecast as a simple rule that the
central bank has to follow (in order to be transparent and accountable, for instance). The central
bank￿s problem is then to find what the forecast horizon of such a suboptimal rule should be, given its
preferences for inflation stabilisation (and possibly other objectives). Such models of inflation targeting
have been analysed by eg Amato and Laubach (1999), Batini and Haldane (1999), Batini and Nelson
(1999) and Leitemo (1999). Numerical examples suggest that neither very short nor very long forecast
horizons are desirable, but that the optimal horizon may very well be around two years.
Another guide to understanding the links between forecasts and monetary policy has been offered by
Rudebusch and Svensson (1999). They compare different simple rules and calculate the ￿social loss￿
associated with them under different assumptions about the central bank￿s preferences for price,
output and interest rate stability (given certain assumptions about crucial relations in the economy).
Their analysis suggests that forward-looking Taylor-type rules (Taylor (1993)) of the following form are
quite robust, in the sense that they perform relatively well under different objective functions:
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where  it
  denotes a benchmark level of the short-term interest rate that is the central bank￿s policy
rate;  EI i ts tsj t t (; ) ,       1  is the forecast of inflation between () t s   and  () t s j  , conditional on
the information available at time t  and on the assumption of an unchanged interest rate; and
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tt (; ) ,,         1  is the corresponding conditional forecast of the level of the ￿output
gap￿ (ie the deviation between (log) actual and potential output) accumulated between periods () th 
and  () thi . The parameter 
  is the central bank￿s (constant) inflation target. Note that
information lags may imply that actual values in t and (conditionally) expected values at t are not the
same. The information set  It  may thus not include all information on the outcome of all variables in
period t and earlier.
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We will use (1) as one benchmark interest rate rule for our analysis of Swedish monetary policy. This
is justified not only by the results reported by Rudebusch and Svensson (1999), but also because
rules of this type seem to be able to describe monetary policy in other countries where price
stabilisation has been an important goal (cf Clarida et al (1998, 1999)).
13 We will use coefficients
suggested by Rudebusch and Svensson (1999) to define a benchmark rule which we label the ￿RS
rule￿.
14 There is, however, no self-evident first candidate for a simple rule and sensitivity analyses are
of course needed. In particular, it may be interesting to compare the actual interest rate also with a
rule that puts zero weight on the output gap, since the Riksbank has repeatedly stressed that its
interest rate decisions are mainly based on an assessment of future inflation. Concerns for output
stabilisation have not been expressed as often, although it has been explicitly declared that certain
temporary deviations from the inflation target may be accepted if a more aggressive monetary policy
would imply unacceptably large swings in interest rates and real economic activity; see eg Berg
(1999), Heikensten and Vredin (1998) and Heikensten (1999). How much weight the Riksbank has put
on output stabilisation in practice is thus an open question. We will therefore derive data-based
estimates of the coefficients in (1) that capture the empirical relation between the Riksbank￿s forecasts
and its policy rate. This version of (1) is labelled the ￿RB rule￿.
3.2 Defining the arguments in the simple rule
Irrespective of whether we want to define the coefficients of (1) on theoretical or empirical grounds, we
first have to define the forecasting horizons s and h and the time spans of the forecasted inflation rate
() s j   and output gap () hi  . The time spans must be equal to one year, since the forecasts that
we have access to cover only the annual frequency (and the inflation target is defined in terms of
annual inflation). The maximum forecast horizon in Tables 1 and 2 is 12 quarters, so with t denoting
quarters,  s 12  and h 12 . In the Inflation Reports, the Riksbank declares that the forecast horizon
which governs monetary policy lies 12 to 24 months ahead, which suggests that 48  s . In our
applications, we have to use a time-varying forecast horizon, because forecasts are made quarterly
but only for annual inflation rates. The inflation forecasts by the Riksbank which we feed into the
benchmark rule are underlined in Table 1. The benchmark interest rate is thus calculated using only a
subset of the available inflation forecasts. We do this partly to make our analysis easier to perform and
explain, but also because a simple rule with a forecast horizon of about six to eight quarters seems
reasonable in view of actual statements made by central bankers.
15
The choice of the value of h is more difficult, but given the standard view on the transmission
mechanism of monetary policy it seems reasonable that h s  . We have chosen to base our
benchmark rules on the current output gap.
16 It still has to be forecasted, however, since neither the
level of potential GDP nor that of current GDP can be observed within the current quarter. The former
is unobservable and the latter is reported with a considerable lag. Another problem is that we do not
have access to forecasts of the output gap, but only of the growth rates of GDP. Taking the first
difference of (1), we obtain:
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where  t  means that first differences are taken with respect to subscript t. If we thus are willing to
make assumptions about the forecasted growth of potential output and approximate the change in the
forecast of (log) GDP with the forecast of the change in (log) GDP, then we can feed the forecasts of
current GDP growth and of the change in the inflation forecast (between two successive forecast
occasions) into (2) and calculate the change in the benchmark interest rate. The forecasts of GDP
growth that we use are underlined in Table 2.
Furthermore, we do not have time-series observations of inflation and GDP growth forecasts made by
the Riksbank each quarter, but only the forecasts made on the 21 occasions reported in Tables 1
and 2. This makes it hard to decide what measures of it
*  and it1 we should use. Consider eg the
forecasts of GDP growth 1998 and inflation 2000 made in May 1998. Should we use the simple rule to
calculate what the benchmark interest rate change it
*  should be between 4 June and 3 June 1998,
since the Inflation Report was published on 4 June? Or should we look at the interest rate change
between the May forecast and the immediately preceding forecast in February the same year, ie for
the period between, say, mid-May 1998 and mid-February 1998? In the former case, the lagged
interest rate change in rule (2) should (perhaps) be the change between 3 June and 2 June, whereas
in the latter case the change between mid-February 1998 and mid-November 1997 may seem a
natural measure of it1. We have chosen to divide the time period that the sample spans into
21 shorter periods that together cover all interest rate changes made during the whole sample period.
Each forecast round is thus assumed to be associated, via the simple rule, with interest rate changes
made from the day halfway back to the previous forecast round and up until halfway towards the next
forecast round. For instance, the forecasts from May 1998 are used to calculate a benchmark interest
rate change between 1 April 1998 and 15 July 1998. The lagged interest rate change in this case
is the change between 1 January 1998 and 30 March 1998.
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3.3 The RS rule
The first benchmark rule we will look at sets 1 15  . ,  2 05  .  and  3 06  . . This is (almost) the
best simple rule reported by Rudebusch and Svensson (1999) in their Table 3; in this case the central
bank￿s loss function, which is used to define the optimal policy, puts equal weight on inflation and
output stabilisation and the weight on interest rate smoothing is half as large.
In the calibration of the benchmark interest rate implied by the RS rule, the Riksbank￿s forecast of the
potential growth of output has been set to 2.2% per year. We have no data on the assumptions about
the potential growth of output that should be associated with the inflation and GDP forecasts in
Table 1 and Table 2, and hence are forced to make a guess. We know that the potential growth of
output has typically been assumed to lie in the interval 1.5-2.5%, and that the figure 2.2% has been
used at least some of the time.
3.4 The RB rule
As noted in the introduction, the purpose of this paper is not to find the rule which best captures the
Riksbank￿s actual policy in the period 1992-98. If, however, the RS rule is very far from the Riksbank￿s
own desired rule, then the use of (2) as a benchmark rule would be quite meaningless. This has led us
to investigate how well (2) empirically tracks the actual policy rate changes.
Using the data on inflation and GDP growth forecasts underlined in Tables 1 and 2 respectively and
the definition of i  discussed above, we get the following ordinary least-squares regression:
    . ( ;) . ( ;) . . ,
., .,
(. ) , (. ) , (. ) (. ) i E Ii E y Ii i
R
t t ts tsj t t t th thi t t t  

       081 005 062 009
065 053






                                                     
17 Alternatively, we could have calculated a benchmark interest rate change for each day, month or quarter, by assuming that
the forecasts which enter the simple rule are the most recent forecasts. This is something we recommend for future work.BIS Paper No 3 211
wherei the numbers within parentheses are standard errors,  R
2  is the multiple coefficient of
determination and   is the standard error of regression.
The residual diagnostics indicate that the error terms are close to white noise.
18 Hence, the arguments
on the right-hand side of (3) seem on average to have good explanatory power for the systematic
changes in the policy rate over the sample period.
Some features of (3) are especially noteworthy. First, the coefficient on GDP growth is not significantly
different from zero. When we compare the residuals from (3) with the ￿policy shocks￿ implied by the
theoretical RS rule (rule (2) using the coefficient values given in Section 3.3) we see that the
theoretical rule produces particularly large shocks for the first two observations in our sample (see
Section 4 below). One may of course argue that the Riksbank￿s policy may have changed during the
sample period, eg because a particularly contractionary policy was needed in the beginning of the new
regime to establish credibility for the inflation target. The full-sample estimates are compared with
various subsample estimates in Table 4. We have deleted observations both from the beginning of the
sample and from the end. All results (even (3)) must of course be interpreted with great care, because
of the limited number of observations that are available to us (at most 18). There are no significant
differences between the coefficient estimates from any of the subsamples and those reported from the
analysis of the full sample. Still, it can be noted that the point estimates of the coefficient on the output
gap increase steadily as more and more observations from the beginning of the sample are deleted. It
may be tempting to conclude that the Riksbank was a more ￿strict￿ inflation targeter in the beginning of
the new regime and has become more ￿flexible￿ over the years; but the statistical evidence from this
small sample only provides weak support for this hypothesis.
Another interesting result is that the point estimates of the intercept are roughly consistent with the
argument that the constant in (3) approximates  2y
P  with y
P  22 . , as assumed in
Section 3.3.
19 For instance, for the full sample with an estimate of  2 005  .  and an assumption of
y
P  22 .  the implied value of the constant is ￿0.11, while the empirical estimate is ￿0.09. For the
sample using observations 9-19, the estimate of 2 is 0.49 and the implied value of the constant is
￿1.08, while the empirical estimate is 116 . . If the true coefficient for the output gap in the Riksbank￿s
policy rule is zero, then the constant in (3) should also be zero. The estimates are indeed not
significantly different from zero.
These empirical results strengthen our belief that forward-looking Taylor-type rules serve as a useful
benchmark for a study of Swedish monetary policy. The particular form (2), in combination with the
coefficient values given in Section 3.3 (the RS rule), can be questioned, however. A rule which
restricts the coefficient on GDP growth to zero seems to be at least as relevant a benchmark (in view
of the Riksbank￿s own statements about its reaction function combined with the evidence from (3)).
Estimating (2) upon restricting the reaction coefficient on the output component to zero gives:
20
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AR  is an F test against serial correlation of order two;  
NORM
2
 is a normality test;  F
ARCH  tests
for conditional heteroscedasticity of order one;  F
H  and  F
HC  are F tests for heteroscedasticity with and without regressor-
cross products respectively (see Doornik and Hendry (1997) for further details). Numbers within parentheses are p values.
19 This argument is based on the assumption that 
0  in (1) is indeed constant. It has been argued that it should vary with
eg changes in the equilibrium real interest rate (see Hall (2000)).
20 The residual diagnostics are similar to those obtained using the unconstrained specification and are for expository
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In the next section we will use this empirical rule, which we label the RB rule, as another benchmark,




The differences between the actual change in the interest rate and the change predicted by the simple
benchmark rules - the theoretical RS rule (rule (2) using the coefficient values from Section 3.3) and
the empirical RB rule (4) - may be interpreted as different measures of ￿policy shocks￿ created by
discretionary deviations from the rules. Formally, let is f t
* (, )    be the policy rate change computed
conditional on rule s and forecasts f. The ￿policy shocks￿ then are  ii s f tt R B R B 
* (, )    and
 ii s f t t RS RB 
* (, )    for the RB and RS rule respectively. Here, sRB  and sRS  denote the RB and RS
rules respectively and  fRB the Riksbank￿s forecasts of inflation and output growth.
The actual policy rate is compared with the rates implied by the benchmark rules in Figure 4. The
difference between the thick solid line (the actual rate) and the dotted line is the ￿policy shock￿
compared with the RS rule, while the difference between the thick and thin solid lines is the ￿policy
shock￿ using the RB rule as the benchmark. In order to understand this figure, it is useful to consider
eg the increase in the interest rate between 15 June and 30 November 1995 (ie the increase in the
interest rate which we associate with the forecasts made in October 1995). During this period the
policy rate was raised by 0.25 percentage points, from 8.66% to 8.91%. Had the Riksbank followed its
own simple RB rule (4) exactly, it would have raised the interest rate by 8 basis points more, to 8.99%.
If the Riksbank had instead followed the theoretical RS rule then it would have raised the interest rate
by another 16 basis points, to 9.15%. In this case there thus seems to have been a negative ￿policy
shock￿ to the interest rate, irrespective of our choice of benchmark rule.
The deviations between the actual interest rate and the benchmark rates, in most cases (all except
two), have the same sign for both benchmark rules. The deviations from the estimated RB rule are of
course, on average, smaller than the deviations from the theoretical RS rule. The differences between
the two estimates of ￿policy shocks￿ are nevertheless surprisingly small, in view of the fact that the RS
rule has been defined without any reference to how monetary policy in Sweden has actually been
conducted. As noted already in Section 3 above, the differences between the RS and RB rules are
larger at the beginning of the sample than towards the end.
Another interesting result is that although the RS rule often suggests a change in the policy rate in the
same direction as the actual change, it implies a more aggressive policy than the one actually
followed. The Riksbank has thus chosen a smoother path for the policy rate than it would have chosen
had it followed the theoretical RS rule. There are, however, some exceptions to this pattern, in
particular the decreases of the policy rate during the first half of 1996; here the Riksbank lowered the
interest rate by more than the simple RS rule implies.
An interesting topic for future work is to look at the ￿policy shocks￿ more carefully, to see if they can be
systematically related to other macro variables, or if they can be understood through the official
explanations of policy given in eg the Riksbank￿s Inflation Reports.
22
                                                     
21 As noted above, there may be reasons to also restrict the constant in the RB rule (4) to zero. However, because the
coefficient estimate is very close to zero this restriction is of no empirical importance.
22 This would thus follow Romer and Romer￿s (1989) and Leeper￿s (1997) analyses of monetary policy in the United States.BIS Paper No 3 213
5. Alternative forecasts and the Riksbank￿s ￿judgments￿
There are several reasons why the forecasts published by central banks may differ from those made
by other analysts or derived directly from models. One reason is that it cannot be ruled out, of course,
that there is an element of policymaking involved also in the construction of the forecasts (as opposed
to reacting differently to given forecasts). Another is that a central bank may hold the view that it has
an ￿informational advantage￿ (over both other analysts and models), eg in its understanding of the
effects of monetary policy. Relative to purely model-based forecasts, it may also be the case that
professional forecasters believe that they can do better by making use of special information that is
difficult to incorporate in standard macro forecasting models, eg high-frequency information from
survey data or financial markets.
In order to shed light on the nature of judgments made at the forecasting stage, we will now compare
the Riksbank￿s forecasts with two alternative sets of forecasts on which the bank could very well have
chosen to base policy. One set is derived from a VAR model (the purely model-based alternative), the
other simply consists of averages (medians) of other Swedish institutions￿ forecasts. Below, we start
out by briefly describing the VAR model. We then turn to some practical problems that need to be
addressed when undertaking and interpreting ex post forecasting. After having compared the various
forecasts using standard measures of forecasting accuracy, we feed them into the benchmark rules
and translate the differences in forecasts into differences in policy rate changes. These are our two
measures of the Riksbank￿s ￿judgments￿.
5.1 Constructions of alternative forecasts
The VAR model that we consider is a version of the open economy quarterly VAR proposed by
Jacobson et al (2000).
23 The model is a seven-variable VAR with four lags. The endogenous variables
are: the Swedish CPI; Swedish real GDP; the short-term (three-month) nominal Treasury bill rates for
Sweden and Germany; a foreign CPI; foreign real GDP; and a nominal effective exchange rate. To
handle various deterministic breaks and regime shifts in Sweden and foreign countries, the model is
augmented by a set of dummy variables.
We do not believe that this VAR framework necessarily constitutes the best possible forecasting tool
for Swedish inflation and GDP growth.
24 Rather, we wish to derive some model forecasts of inflation
and GDP growth that the Riksbank could very well have made, as alternatives to the actual judgmental
forecasts. Our ambition has been to identify some simple empirical model with reasonable statistical
properties that contains approximately the sort of information that policymakers and other analysts use
when discussing monetary policy. The evaluation of the statistical properties of the VAR model
undertaken by Jacobson et al (2000) shows that the model fulfils the criterion of being reasonably
specified from a statistical point of view (see Tables 1 and 3 in their paper).
The specification of the VAR model implies that the real exchange rate and the short-term interest rate
differential are stationary (I(0)). In addition, the foreign variables are not driven by three independent
trends but share common trends and thus are cointegrated.
There are some important practical problems involved in ex post forecasting. A first problem is related
to the input data that are used when deriving the forecasts. It is well known that published data on
many macro variables are frequently revised and that the ￿final observation￿ on a particular series is
often only available after a considerable lag, which may sometimes be several years. This means that
the real-time forecasts of the Riksbank are sometimes not conditioned on the observations on macro
variables available today but rather on preliminary figures that were later revised. A completely
realistic real-time scenario would hence require the use of (some) macro series that are revised over
time. While this is possible in principle, if one is willing to carefully reconstruct all revisions that were
undertaken and recursively update the database that is used in the econometric analysis, the revisions
                                                     
23 A detailed description of the data is given in Jacobson et al (2000). Estimations are undertaken using PcFIML version 9.0.
The full sample length of our updated data set is 1970:1-1998:4.
24 It seems that the forecasting performance of VARs may be improved by imposing Bayesian prior restrictions on estimated
parameters; see Robertson and Tallman (1999) for a recent review and Villani (1999) for an analysis of the VAR model that
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in the case of Swedish data do not appear to be of such a magnitude that such a cumbersome
approach is warranted (at least not as concerns the revisions undertaken during the sample period
that we consider). Our analyses will thus be based on the most current observations on the variables
that are available.
25
While data revisions in our case do not seem to be quantitatively important, there is still the problem
that data on many macro variables are available only after a considerable time lag. This publication lag
implies that a forecast of a certain variable made at, say, time t, may not be based on information up to
and including t but rather on () tk  . The problem becomes particularly ticklish since for our VAR
model the value of k is not the same for all variables. In particular, for interest rates and exchange
rates the publication lag  is zero, for consumer prices it is almost zero, whereas quarterly GDP is
published with a lag of approximately two quarters. The approach that has been chosen here - and
which is summarised in Table 5 - is to make the simplifying assumption that inflation forecasts from the
VAR model always make use of more recent information on all variables than the GDP growth
forecasts from the same model. The model-based forecasts of inflation have an informational
advantage over the Riksbank￿s inflation forecasts in that they use more information than was actually
available in real time. In the case of forecasts of the growth rate of GDP, the opposite holds true.
A third issue that deserves comment concerns the updating of the parameters in the cointegration
space. The cointegration matrix depends on two estimated parameters (in the normalised
cointegration relation between the foreign variables). The updating (re-estimation) procedure that we
have chosen implies that these parameters are recursively re-estimated with an interval lag of
approximately four forecasts (see Table 5). Looking at the details of the estimations (not shown to
save space) it can be seen that the estimates of the parameters in the cointegration space only vary
very little over time.
26 This indicates that the exact design of the updating procedure for the
cointegration space is probably not very important, but we still believe that our recursive interval-lag
procedure is rather reasonable as a description of a situation forecasters would face in practice.
The issue of the real-time use of the deterministic dummy variables is presumably more important.
The problem concerns one particular dummy variable that represents the introduction of the floating
exchange rate, inflation targeting regime in Sweden in 1992:4. This dummy variable deserves special
mention because its dating implies that it will become effective during the forecasting sample period.
The procedure adopted in our exercises assumes that the hypothetical real-time model forecaster
would immediately have interpreted the float of the Swedish krona in the fourth quarter of 1992 as a
permanent ￿exogenous￿ policy regime shift to his VAR model.
The medians of forecasts by other analysts are computed as follows: for each month in which the
Riksbank has produced new forecasts, the medians of the latest available forecasts (including
forecasts made that same month) from nine other Swedish institutions have been calculated. The
institutions that are included are: the Ministry of Finance; the Wholesale & Retail Research Institute
(Handelns Utredningsinstitut); the National Institute of Economic Research (Konjunkturinstitutet); the
Federation of County Councils (Landstingsf￿rbundet); the Trade Union Confederation
(Landsorganisationen, LO); Handelsbanken; Nordbanken; SE-banken; and Sparbanken (the latter four
are commercial banks).
5.2 Comparisons of the different forecasts
In Figures 5 and 6 Sveriges Riksbank￿s forecasts (RB) are depicted along with the forecasts from the
VAR model, the medians of the other institutions￿ forecasts and actual outcomes.
27,28 In addition, the
                                                     
25 During the summer of 1999 Statistics Sweden undertook a more fundamental revision of the Swedish national accounts
system (the new system is called SNA93/ESA95). Since the forecasts from the Riksbank used in this paper are all
conditional on the data available before this revision, our calculations and analyses throughout are based on data according
to the earlier system of national accounts (called SNA68).
26 Details of these results are available from the authors upon request.
27 Details on how the alternative forecasts have been constructed are available from the authors upon request.
28 Note that the dates on the horizontal axes in Figures 5 and 6 refer to the year for which the forecasts have been made. For
instance, the three data points for the Riksbank inflation forecast for 1998 (the dotted (RB) line) show the three
￿two-years-ahead￿ forecasts of inflation 1998 made in June 1996-February 1997.BIS Paper No 3 215
bottom lines of Table 3 summarise the overall forecasting accuracy of the different forecasts using
RMSEs.
Looking first at the forecasts of inflation (Figure 5) it can be seen that all two-years-ahead forecasts
persistently overpredict inflation over the four years of the sample period. The Riksbank￿s forecasts
are quite close to the medians of the forecasts from other institutions and, accordingly, their RMSEs
are also similar. The forecasts from the VAR model are not very different either, if we look at forecasts
for 1996 (ie forecasts made in October 1994) and onwards. The initial forecasts from the VAR model
display very large differences to the other two sets of forecasts, however. The VAR model first
(December 1992) severely underestimates inflation two years ahead, then overestimates it by an even
larger margin. Indeed, if one excludes the first two forecasts for 1994, then the RMSE for the VAR
forecasts decreases to approximately 2.01 whereas the RMSE for the Riksbank￿s forecasts increases
to 2.02 (the corresponding numbers if one also excludes the forecasts for 1995 are 2.11 and 2.41
respectively). The VAR forecasts thus appear to have a quicker ￿error correction mechanism￿ than the
Riksbank￿s forecasts, but perform very badly in the beginning of the sample period.
The forecasts of GDP growth are displayed in Figure 6. In contrast to the inflation forecasts, there is
no clear bias tendency for these forecasts. In general, the prediction errors are much smaller than for
the inflation forecasts, which may be related to the fact that we look at current-year forecasts as
opposed to two-years-ahead forecasts in the case of inflation. From Table 3, it can again be seen that
the VAR model overall performs worse than the Riksbank￿s forecasts and that the performance of the
other institutions￿ forecasts is similar.
In conclusion, the judgmental forecasts made by the Riksbank (possibly with the aid of forecasting
models) have been rather successful compared with forecasts generated by the VAR model. Although
there have been systematic overpredictions of inflation by the Riksbank, the forecasts are very close
to the medians of other institutions￿ forecasts. More interestingly, the forecast errors could have been
even larger if VAR models had been used, at least in the early period after the shift to the inflation
targeting regime. The performance of the VAR model, however, improves over time, and in some
cases even becomes better than the judgmental forecasts towards the end of the sample period.
These results are perhaps not so surprising. In 1993 and 1994 the inflation targeting regime was still
quite young and thus backward-looking model-based forecasts (like VAR forecasts) tended to be too
heavily influenced by the previously higher average inflation rate. Policymakers and other forecasters
therefore had reasons to use their own judgments to adjust the models￿ forecasts. Recently, however,
it seems as if model-based forecasts have adjusted more rapidly to the large decline in inflation while
the judgments have had a larger bias towards higher inflation.
29 One lesson from this is perhaps that
model-based forecasts can be expected to be less biased than judgmental forecasts in stable (or at
least less unstable) environments, while judgments should be particularly useful after regime shifts.
30
5.3 The effects of ￿judgments￿ on the interest rate
Equipped with a set of alternative (real-time) forecasts we are able to estimate the effects of the
Riksbank￿s ￿judgments￿ on its interest rate policy. We do this by feeding the three sets of forecasts -
the Riksbank￿s, the other institutions￿ and the VAR model￿s - into the RB rule used in Sections 3 and 4.
Algebraically, we compute  is f is f tR BR B tR BA L T
** (, ) (, )     , where  f ALT  is either the VAR forecast or
the median forecast from other analysts of inflation and output growth. The different pictures of the
effects of ￿judgments￿ that we get by plotting these quantities are presented in Figure 7.
The estimates of the effects of ￿judgments￿ differ both in size and sign depending on whether we
choose to contrast the Riksbank￿s forecasts with model-based (VAR) forecasts or the medians of other
                                                     
29 It must of course be remembered that our model forecasts are conditioned on a regime-shift dummy in 1992:4. Furthermore,
there are more general reasons for interpreting the comparisons between the Riksbank￿s forecasts and the alternative
forecasts with care. As emphasised previously, the Riksbank￿s forecasts are intended to be conditioned on the assumption
of an unchanged interest rate. But, as also noted above (see Section 2), this difference may not be quantitatively important
in practice.
30 We have experimented with alternative specifications of the VAR model and also made comparisons with a simple random-
walk model. These models have typically produced larger forecast errors (and larger estimates of the influence of
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institutions￿ forecasts. Even abstracting from the first two observations in our sample - when the VAR
model produced extreme forecasts - the estimates of the Riksbank￿s ￿judgments￿ are much larger if
the VAR model is used as a norm than if we make the comparisons with other institutions￿ forecasts.
The differences between the Riksbank￿s forecasts and the medians of other institutions￿ seldom
correspond to interest rate effects larger than 0.5 percentage points. Compared to the VAR model￿s
forecasts, however, the effects of the Riksbank￿s judgmental forecasts are more often close to, and
sometimes even larger than, 1 percentage point.
It is likely that the use of the medians of other institutions￿ forecasts involves an underestimation of the
effects of ￿judgments￿ in forecasting, since individual institutions￿ forecasts presumably deviate more
from the Riksbank￿s forecasts than the medians. It is less obvious that the comparison with the VAR
model involves an overestimation of the Riksbank￿s ￿judgments￿. As noted above, the VAR model￿s
forecasts are quite close to the Riksbank￿s, except during the early part of the sample, and both sets of
forecasts involve systematic overestimations of inflation two years ahead. It is conceivable that a VAR
model with better forecasting properties could have been constructed. If so, our estimates of the
Riksbank￿s ￿judgments￿ could very well have been larger.
Comparing Figures 4 and 7, our results suggest that the quantitative effects of ￿judgments￿ may be at
least as important as the effects of ￿policy shocks￿.
31 There does not, however, appear to be any
systematic relation between the signs of the effects of ￿policy shocks￿ and ￿judgments￿.
32 Sometimes
these different aspects of policymaking seem to affect the interest rate in the same direction, but just
as often their effects seem to go in opposite directions.
6. Conclusions
We have found that, for the first six years of the floating exchange rate, inflation targeting regime, it is
possible to describe Swedish monetary policy quite well by a forward-looking Taylor-type rule.
According to the estimated ￿RB rule￿ there has been a significant response by the Riksbank to its own
inflation forecasts. On the other hand, interest rate policy does not seem to have been significantly
affected by the Riksbank￿s forecasts of GDP growth (at least not on average). Nevertheless, the size
of the deviations from the theoretical ￿RS rule￿, suggested by Rudebusch and Svensson (1999), which
puts some weight on the output gap, does not seem particularly large either. It is also noteworthy that
the signs of the estimated ￿policy shocks￿ are the same, irrespective of whether we use the RB rule or
the RS rule as a benchmark, and that the size of the ￿policy shocks￿ has decreased over time.
33 Actual
policy has been characterised by a somewhat more gradual adjustment of the interest rate than the
RS rule prescribes, but there does not seem to have been any positive or negative bias; in most cases
the policy rate has been changed in the direction suggested by the RS rule.
The deviations between the Riksbank￿s forecasts and the medians of other institutions￿ forecasts have
been relatively small, which suggests that the Riksbank￿s judgmental adjustments of its forecasts have
not been larger than those of other institutions. An alternative (or perhaps equivalent) interpretation of
this result is that the Riksbank has (had) no large ￿informational (dis)advantage￿ compared to other
professional forecasters. However, the difference between the Riksbank￿s forecasts and the forecasts
of a VAR model are occasionally quite large. In the beginning of the sample period, immediately after
the regime shift in monetary policy, the VAR model severely overestimated inflation. The Riksbank￿s
judgmental forecasts presumably took more account of the effects of the regime shift, which led to
smaller forecast errors. Towards the end of the sample period, however, the Riksbank￿s forecasts
were ￿more conservative￿ than the VAR forecasts and were associated with somewhat larger errors.
                                                     
31 A comparison based on the RS rule reinforces this result. In this case, ￿judgments￿ are quite considerably larger than ￿policy
shocks￿. The results are available upon request.
32 The sample correlations range between ￿0.31 and 0.15. A correlation larger than 0.46 or smaller than ￿0.46 is
approximately significant at the 5% test level.
33 ￿Policy shocks￿ have become smaller in terms of percentage points, but since the level of the interest rate has also
decreased, they may have been quite stable in some relative sense. However, since it is the level of nominal interest rates
and inflation in percentage points that plays an economic role (just as in the case of tax rates), it is the first feature that is
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That there may sometimes be a rather sizeable judgmental element in the central bank forecasts
suggests that it may not always be very easy to replicate (or even come close to) them using
reasonable forecasting models and thus points to the need to supplement central bank forecasts with
explanations concerning how the forecasts are derived. Inflation Reports or similar official policy
documents appear to be natural forums for that purpose.
It would be interesting, at least in principle, to feed the estimated ￿policy shocks￿ and ￿judgments￿ into
a macroeconomic model to investigate whether these interventions seem to have had positive
(stabilising) effects or not. Of course, Lucas￿s critique of policy evaluations with econometric models
forcefully spells out the problems associated with such an exercise. There are reasons to expect,
however, that the estimated effects of ￿policy shocks￿ and ￿judgments￿ will be quite small. This is a
common result in the literature on the effects of shocks to monetary policy more generally, partly
because most models of the transmission mechanisms suggest that changes in nominal interest rates
have rather little impact, but also because the typical interest rate ￿shocks￿ appear to be quite small.
34
It has been argued in connection with previous studies (see eg the discussion between Leeper (1997)
and Romer and Romer (1997)) that many earlier estimates may have shown misleadingly large (or
small) effects of monetary policy, because of difficulties in distinguishing between exogenous and
endogenous interest rate movements. In this paper we have tried to handle such problems by making
use of the Riksbank￿s own forecasts, ie by using information which the bank has claimed that policy
really has been based upon (rather than eg ex post data on inflation and output). It should be
worthwhile, therefore, to exploit this data on the central bank￿s information set further, eg by integrating
our analysis with the approach suggested by Leeper and Zha (1999).
To our knowledge, our study constitutes the first comprehensive attempt to evaluate Swedish
monetary policy during the inflation targeting regime. The use of the central bank￿s own forecasts
distinguishes our study from eg studies of UK monetary policy by McCallum (2000) and Nelson (2000).
Nevertheless, more work is obviously needed in this area. As suggested by Orphanides (1999), the
use of real-time data on the output gap may affect the interpretation of monetary policy, so one
interesting task for future research is to make an attempt to more carefully reproduce the Riksbank￿s
estimates of actual and potential output (although we emphasise that this is difficult for reasons
previously discussed; see Section 3).
A further extension is to compare our estimates of ￿policy shocks￿ and ￿judgments￿ with official
explanations of monetary policy in the Inflation Reports and other policy documents. Is there a
systematic pattern in the deviations from the simple policy rules and/or in the deviations between the
Riksbank￿s forecasts and alternative forecasts? This would thus involve the same type of analyses as
Romer and Romer (1989) and Leeper (1997) have applied to US data.
Ellingsen and S￿derstr￿m (1998), inter alia, have pointed out that the market responses to changes in
the central bank￿s instrument interest rate depend on whether the market interprets a change in the
instrument as reflecting new information about eg future inflation, or as a sign of a change in policy. In
principle, the data on the Riksbank￿s own forecasts used in this paper could also be used to separate
￿policy shocks￿ from ￿new information￿ (measured by eg changes in forecasts). One could then study
how the yield curve responds to such innovations. As pointed out by Rudebusch (1998), among
others, the yield curve and futures markets also contain information about the systematic and
unexpected parts of monetary policy. There are thus several different ways to derive ￿policy shocks￿,
and further work is needed to increase our understanding of the design and effects of monetary policy.
                                                     
34 We have added our ￿policy shocks￿ and ￿judgments￿ into a simple AS-AD model (used by the Riksbank for other purposes)
and the results suggest that the effects on inflation and the output gap are indeed small.218 BIS Paper No 3
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Note: Inflation is measured as average annual inflation. The series F199X show forecasts for the calendar year 199X available
at the quarters indicated by the horizontal axis. Where no new forecast is available in a quarter, the most recent available
forecast has been used.
Figure 2


























Note: GDP growth is measured at an annual rate. The series F199X show forecasts for the calendar year 199X available at the
quarters indicated by the horizontal axis. Where no new forecast is available in a quarter, the most recent available forecast has
been used.BIS Paper No 3 219
Figure 3

















Note: The series shows the development of the repo rate on a daily basis.
Figure 4




















Note: The thick solid line denotes the actual policy rate. The thin solid line denotes the changes of the policy rate that should
have obtained had the rate been adjusted according to the RB rule using the Riksbank￿s forecasts. The dotted line denotes the
changes of the policy rate that should have obtained had the rate been adjusted according to the RS rule using the Riksbank￿s
forecasts. The horizontal axis has been ￿truncated￿ in order to correspond to symmetrically centred time points of the forecast
dates (see the discussion in the text for further details).220 BIS Paper No 3
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Note: Inflation is measured as average annual inflation. VAR are the forecasts derived from a VAR model. Median are the
median forecasts derived from a set of alternative analysts forecasts. For further details see the text. RB are the forecasts from
Sveriges Riksbank. For each year on the horizontal axis the lines show the corresponding forecasts (made approximately two
years previously) or actual value for that year.
Figure 6
























Note: GDP growth is measured at an annual rate. VAR are the forecasts derived from a VAR model. Median are the median
forecasts derived from a set of alternative analysts forecasts. For further details see the text. RB are the forecasts from Sveriges
Riksbank. For each year on the horizontal axis the lines show the corresponding forecasts (made within the current year) or
actual value for that year.BIS Paper No 3 221
Figure 7
The Riksbank￿s ￿judgments￿


































































Note: The bars represent the differences between the changes in the policy rate that should have obtained had the rate been
adjusted according to the RB rule using the Riksbank￿s forecasts and the alternative forecasts (VAR, median of other analysts￿
forecasts) respectively.222 BIS Paper No 3
Table 1
Actual inflation and forecasts by Sveriges Riksbank
Forecast for year
Forecast derived
at time 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001
1992: Dec 5.2 3.5
1993: Mar 5.6 3.2 3.0
1993: Aug 4.8 3.2 3.2
1994: Jan 2.9 2.9
1994: Apr 2.0 3.1 2.9
1994: Oct 2.4 3.5 4.2
1995: Feb 3.2 3.9
1995: Oct 3.0 3.1 3.4
1996: Jan 2.1 2.5
1996: Jun 1.6 2.3 2.5
1996: Oct 1.0 1.9 2.4
1997: Feb 1.0 1.9
1997: Jun 0.9 1.9 2.2
1997: Aug 0.9 2.1 2.3
1997: Nov 0.9 2.1 2.6
1998: Feb 1.6 2.1 2.0
1998: May 0.5 0.9 2.1
1998: Sep 0.6 0.8 1.9
1998: Nov 0.4 0.6 1.2
1999: Mar 0.3 1.0
1999: May 0.2 1.0 1.6
Actual 4.7 2.3 2.8 0.8 0.9 0.4
R M S E 0 . 6 0 . 7 70 . 3 82 . 1 81 . 2 11 . 4 2
V a r i a n c e 0 . 1 60 . 3 20 . 0 41 . 3 90 . 8 30 . 6 4
Note: The forecasts used in the RS and RB rules are bold and italic. RMSE is the root mean-squared error. Variance is the
centred sample variance of the forecasts.BIS Paper No 3 223
Table 2
Actual real GDP growth and forecasts by Sveriges Riksbank
Forecast for year
Forecast derived
at time 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001
1992: Dec    1.4 1.5 1.7
1993: Mar    1.3 2.3 2.8
1993: Aug    1.8 2.2 2.9
1994: Jan 2.1 2.7
1994: Apr 2.2 2.7 2.4
1994: Oct 2.0 2.7 2.3
1995: Feb 2.4 2.6
1995: Oct 3.4 3.1 2.6
1996: Jan 2.0 2.3
1996: Jun 1.6 1.8 2.6
1996: Oct 1.5 2.5 2.8
1997: Feb 2.1 3.1
1997: Jun 1.8 3.1 3.6
1997: Aug 2.0 3.0 3.4
1997: Nov 1.5 2.8 3.2
1998: Feb 2.5 2.9 3.0
1998: May 2.7 3.0 2.9
1998: Sep 2.9 2.8 2.6
1998: Nov 2.7 2.1 2.3
1999: Mar 2.1 2.5
1999: May 2.5 3.0 3.0
Actual 1.4 2.2 3.3 3.9 1.3 1.8 2.9
R M S E 0 . 0 0 . 7 01 . 2 31 . 1 41 . 0 50 . 4 50 . 2 1
V a r i a n c e 0 . 0 60 . 0 50 . 0 90 . 3 20 . 2 90 . 0 4
Note: The forecasts used in the RS rule are bold and italic. RMSE is the root mean-squared error. Variance is the centred




Type of forecast Inflation GDP growth No of forecasts
RB 0-steps ahead 0.17 0.59 6
RB 1-step ahead 0.13 (min) 0.26 (min) 3
RB 2-steps ahead 0.43 0.58 4
RB 3-steps ahead 0.86 0.93 6
RB 4-steps ahead 1.41 1.06 5
RB 5-steps ahead 1.36 0.78 2
RB 6-steps ahead 1.20 0.70 3
RB 7-steps ahead 1.75 0.94 5
RB 8-steps ahead 2.41 (max) 1.03 4
RB 9-steps ahead 0.40 1.00 1
RB 10-steps ahead 2.10 0.81 2
RB 11-steps ahead 0.20 1.10 (max) 1
RB 1.90 0.68 12 ( ); 19 (y
)
VAR 2.59 1.07 12 ( ); 19 (y
)
Median 1.67 0.84 12 ( ); 19 (y
)
Note: The X-step(s)-ahead forecasts are annual forecasts undertaken X quarter(s) in advance. 0-steps ahead means a
forecast undertaken in the last three months of a year. VAR are the forecasts derived from a VAR model. Median are the
median forecasts derived from a set of alternative analysts￿ forecasts. For further details see the text. RB are the forecasts
from Sveriges Riksbank. Inflation forecasts RB, VAR, Median are two years ahead and GDP growth forecasts RB, VAR,
Median are current year.  denotes inflation and y GDP growth.224 BIS Paper No 3
Table 4
Recursive analysis of equation (3)
Coefficient estimate [standard error] on
Recursive sample Constant Inflation Output Interest rate








3-19 0.05 0.80 0.03 0.62
4-19 0.69 0.89 0.31 0.53
5-19 0.65 0.91 0.29 0.58
6-19 0.68 0.94 0.31 0.57
7-19 0.70 1.03 0.33 0.57
8-19 1.09 1.06 0.45 0.40
9-19 1.16 1.07 0.49 0.41
2-18 0.09 0.78 0.05 0.62
2-17 0.07 0.79 0.04 0.63
2-16 0.07 0.80 0.05 0.63
2-15 0.09 0.83 0.05 0.62
2-14 0.09 0.82 0.05 0.62
2-13 0.07 0.83 0.05 0.63
2-12 0.05 0.85 0.04 0.63
Note: None of the recursive-sample estimates in rows two to 15 are significantly different (at the 5% test level) from the full-
sample estimates (top row).
Table 5
Setup for alternative forecasters￿ forecasts
Inflation forecasts Forecasts of GDP growth









 1994 1992:2* 1992
1993: Mar 1993:1 1994 1992:3 1993
1993: Aug 1993:3 1995 1993:1
 1993
1994: Jan 1993:4 1995 1993:3 1994
1994: Apr 1994:1 1995 1993:4 1994
1994: Oct 1994:2* 1996 1994:2 1994
1995: Feb 1995:1 1996 1994:3* 1995
1995: Oct 1995:3 1997 1995:2 1995
1996: Jan 1995:4 1997 1995:3 1996
1996: Jun 1996:2 1998 1995:4 1996
1996: Oct 1996:3* 1998 1996:2 1996
1997: Feb 1997:1 1998 1996:3 1997
1997: Jun 1997:2 1999 1996:4* 1997
1997: Aug 1997:3 1999 1997:1 1997
1997: Nov 1997:4 1999 1997:2 1997
1998: Feb 1998:1* 1999 1997:3 1998
1998: May 1998:2 2000 1997:4 1998
1998: Sep 1998:3 2000 1998:1 1998
1998: Nov 1998:4 2000 1998:2* 1998
Note: * indicates the points in time at which the cointegration-space parameters of the VAR model are re-estimated;
 indicates the time from which the regime-shift dummy in Sweden (the floating exchange rate, inflation targeting, regime) is
included in the VAR.BIS Paper No 3 225
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